Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value by Cremers, K.J. Martijn & Sepe, Simone M.
 
387 
Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, and Firm 
Value 
K.J. Martijn Cremers and Simone M. Sepe** 
ABSTRACT 
In the corporate governance debate, the short-term versus long-
term contention has grown into perhaps today’s most controversial topic. 
In this debate, descriptions of institutional investors tend to present a 
dichotomic nature. These investors are alternatively portrayed as 
homogenously short-termist or as consistent “forces for good,” focused on 
targeting underperforming companies. This Article moves beyond this 
dichotomy. It shows empirically that aggregate institutional investor 
behavior presents nuances that depend on a variety of factors, including 
individual firm characteristics, institutional ownership levels, and 
institutional propensity toward activism. 
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The rise of empowered shareholders has introduced a novel, inter-
temporal dimension in the fundamental corporate law debate over the 
appropriate division of authority between a corporation’s board of 
directors and its shareholders. Among empowered shareholders, 
institutional investors in particular have catalyzed the attention of 
corporate law scholars since the early 1990s. Back then, commentators 
began to report a steady increase in institutional investor ownership,1 with 
many suggesting that this development would be the dawn of a new era of 
shareholder empowerment.2 While the process took longer than initially 
thought, and involved regulatory developments in addition to market 
changes, that era is now upon us. Shareholders, and especially large 
institutional investors, stand today as empowered as ever, having gained 
the ability to influence a firm’s business and investment policy in a 
substantial manner.3 
Sharp disagreement, however, occurs when it comes to assessing 
the consequences of this change in the fact pattern. Defenders of the 
traditional board-centric model of the corporation argue that shareholder 
empowerment exacerbates short-termist issues, incentivizing companies 
to undertake courses of action that are profitable in the short term but 
value-decreasing in the long term.4 On the contrary, shareholder 
                                                     
 1. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 570 (1990). 
 2. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 
39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 827–31 (1991). See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, 
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991). 
 3. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Preserving Director Primacy by Managing Shareholder 
Interventions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 231 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall 
S. Thomas eds., 2015); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder 
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 662 (2010). 
 4. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1736–44 (2006); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 
35 BUS. L. 101, 104 (1979); Michael E. Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests 
in Industry, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1992, at 4. 
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advocates praise the rise of shareholder empowerment as the long-
awaited correction to the moral hazard problem arising out of the 
separation of ownership from control, while downplaying short-termism 
concerns as overstated.5 
This Article examines the role played by institutional investors—
which today comprise banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, 
investment advisors, brokers, pension funds, endowments, and hedge 
funds—within the short-term versus long-term debate in corporate 
governance. Current descriptions of institutional investor behavior tend to 
present a dichotomic nature, with such investors being portrayed either as 
homogenously short-termist or as consistent “forces for good,” focused on 
targeting underperforming companies. Our aim is to move beyond this 
dichotomy, using empirical tools to provide a more exact taxonomy of 
institutional investor behavior along the two crucial dimensions of 
institutional investors’ investment horizons and activism. Further, while 
our work relates to recent empirical studies examining hedge fund 
behavior,6 it essentially focuses on aggregate institutional behavior. 
We begin our empirical investigation by examining the time trends 
in institutional ownership’s levels, holding periods, turnover, and activism 
over the past thirty-five years (from 1980 to 2015). Somewhat 
surprisingly, we find that while institutional investor ownership has 
significantly increased throughout the years, institutional investors as a 
whole seem to have grown more patient and less active. A possible 
explanation for these results is the concurrent rise of passive investment 
approaches, including index funds and exchange-traded funds. 
Our next step is to examine what factors can explain cross-sectional 
differences in institutional investors’ investment horizons and activism, as 
the empirical finding that institutional investors have become more patient 
and less active runs contrary to common assumptions about institutional 
ownership. Our findings indicate that among our independent variables, 
time-invariant firm characteristics captured by firm-fixed effects explain 
most of the cross-sectional variation in institutional holding periods and 
activism (i.e., our dependent variables).  
                                                     
 5. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1651 (2013) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Myth]; Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-
Termism--In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. L. 977, 1004 (2013). 
 6. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1085, 1106–14 (2015) [hereinafter Bebchuck et al., Long-Term Effects] (documenting a 
positive effect of hedge fund activism on firm value in both the short term and the long term). But see 
K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Firm Value (Dec. 14, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693231 
(documenting that the positive short-term effect of hedge funds on firm value is reversed in the long 
term). 
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We next focus on the individual firm characteristics included in our 
set, obtaining the four following results. First, higher firm value (as 
proxied by Tobin’s Q7) predicts shorter institutional holding periods and 
correspondingly higher stock turnover while also being correlated with 
less activism. This seemingly indicates that as firm value increases, 
institutional investors trade stock more frequently, perhaps to exploit 
profit opportunities. 
Second, we find that, while the adoption of a staggered board8 does 
not impact any of our measures of institutional investor behavior, poison 
pills9 predict increased short-termism because their adoption is associated 
with shorter institutional holding periods and higher trading frequency. 
Consistent with results we obtained in prior research,10 this difference 
between staggered boards and poison pills could be explained by the 
different nature of these defensive measures.  
The adoption of a staggered board requires shareholder approval and 
therefore reflects agreement between the board and shareholders. Boards 
can instead unilaterally adopt the poison pill without any dialectical 
confrontation with the shareholders. Based on this fundamental 
distinction, we have argued elsewhere that staggered boards serve a 
positive governance function because the agreed-upon limits they impose 
on the ability of shareholders to interfere with board decision-making help 
address informational inefficiencies and commit shareholders to the 
creation of long-term firm value.11 Conversely, because of their unilateral 
nature, poison pills are more likely to be motivated by managerial moral 
hazard. This could explain why institutional investors react negatively to 
the adoption of a poison pill but remain indifferent to the adoption of a 
staggered board.12 
Third, having more outstanding equity owned by active institutional 
investors considerably reduces the institutional investment horizon—that 
                                                     
 7. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. See Eugene F. 
Fama & Kenneth R. French, Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and 
Debt, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 8 (2002). 
 8. Unlike in a unitary board, in a staggered board, directors are grouped into different classes, 
with each class of directors standing for reelection in successive years. Typically, staggered boards 
have three classes of directors—the maximum number of classes most states permit—with directors 
in each class being elected to three-year terms. See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The 
Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 77 (2016).  
 9. A poison pill consists of stock purchase rights that are granted to existing shareholders in the 
event a corporate raider accumulates more than a certain threshold of outstanding stock and entitle 
the existing shareholders (but not the raider) to acquire newly issued stock at a substantial discount 
from the market price.  
 10. K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Commitment and Entrenchment 
in Corporate Governance, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 732, 761–71 (2016) (showing that defensive 
measures benefit shareholders as long as such measures provide for shareholder approval). 
 11. See id. at 768–70; see also Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8, at 123–26. 
 12. See Cremers, Masconale & Sepe, supra note 10. 
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is, it is associated with shorter holding periods and increased stock 
turnover. Further, higher institutional ownership levels are associated with 
both shorter holding periods and greater activism. These results seem to 
support the claims of board advocates that increased shareholder activism 
is likely to exacerbate short-termist concerns. Indeed, active investors 
would enjoy greater bargaining power to influence a firm’s investment 
policy horizons, and this power would increase with the level of 
outstanding stock held by institutional investors. 
Fourth, firm age is associated with longer holding periods, less 
turnover, and less activism, suggesting that the degree of informational 
asymmetry affecting a specific corporation plays an important role in 
predicting institutional investor behavior. Investors in older firms are 
likely to gather more private information about these firms over time. This 
could explain why institutional investors tend to have longer investment 
horizons in such firms, as well as interfere less with management. 
Alternatively, it could be that the longer a firm exists, the more likely it is 
that the firm is included in some benchmark index, which would explain 
the presence of more patient investors and less active owners. 
Next, to examine the efficiency questions raised by aggregate 
institutional investor behavior, we estimate Tobin’s Q regressions on year- 
and firm-fixed effects, proxies for institutional investor holding periods 
and activism, staggered boards, poison pills, and a set of standard controls. 
Consistent again with the results we documented in prior studies,13 we find 
that the adoption of a staggered board is associated with increased firm 
value. Most importantly, for the present discussion, we also find that such 
a positive effect of staggered boards is considerably stronger in firms 
where institutional investors exhibit longer investment horizons. This 
finding supports the view that a main mechanism through which the 
staggered board adds value is by ensuring that investors give managers 
sufficient time to develop latent assets (i.e., long-term strategies), rather 
than evaluating management performance after relatively brief periods of 
time. 
Conversely, the adoption of a poison pill continues to be negatively 
associated with firm value, even when institutional investors are more 
patient, adding to our inference that the unilateral nature of poison pills 
make this defense more likely to be a reflection of managerial moral 
hazard. 
                                                     
 13. See K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and Long-
Term Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 422 (2017); Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8, at 100–08 
(producing novel empirical evidence that challenges prior cross-sectional studies on the negative 
impact of staggered boards on firm value and showing that staggered boards are positively associated 
with firm value in the long term). 
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Finally, we find that when investors have longer investment horizons 
but are more active, the positive effect of the staggered board on firm value 
decreases. This finding is consistent with our theory that the value added 
through the adoption of a staggered board is the commitment of both 
boards and shareholders to long-term value creation. A staggered board 
serves this function by allowing the board to pursue long-term investments 
in an environment conducive to stable relationships with both shareholders 
and stakeholders. However, when a substantial fraction of the firm’s 
institutional investors are active and thus more likely to pursue short-term 
changes, this challenges the conditions that are required for the staggered 
board to serve its commitment function. 
Overall, our study generates insights on the short-term versus long-
term debate in corporate governance, showing that far from the debate’s 
polarized rendering of homogenously “good” or “bad” institutional 
investors, aggregate institutional investor behavior presents nuances that 
depend on a variety of factors, including individual firm characteristics, 
institutional ownership levels, and institutional propensity toward 
activism.  
This Article continues as follows. Part I frames the terms of the short-
term and long-term debate in corporate governance, reviewing competing 
theoretical positions and both their economic underpinnings and policy 
implications. Part II begins our empirical investigation of institutional 
investor behavior, examining time trends in institutional ownership levels, 
holding periods, turnover, and activism. Part III investigates the factors 
that predict institutional investors’ shorter or longer holding periods and 
more or less activism. Part IV examines the value implications of 
institutional investor behavior. Part V offers some conclusive remarks. 
THE SHORT-TERM VERSUS LONG-TERM DEBATE 
Inter-temporal issues have captured scholarly attention since the 
writings of philosophers David Hume and Jeremy Bentham.14 In the 
corporate context, such issues first emerged during the takeover era of the 
1980s, when rational (as opposed to behavioral) myopia studies made their 
appearance in financial economics theory. Departing from mainstream 
neoclassical models, rational myopia studies suggested that an excessive 
focus on stock market results, combined with informational asymmetries, 
                                                     
 14. See Kevin J. Laverty, Economic “Short-Termism”: The Debate, the Unresolved Issues, and 
the Implications for Management Practice and Research, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 825, 828 (1996). 
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could induce managers to privilege short-term gains over long-term 
returns, with short-termism potentially threatening economic decline.15 
Concerns about inter-temporal choices then faded away during the 
bull market of the 1990s and early 2000s, only to move to the center stage 
of corporate governance discussions in the wake of the financial crisis of 
2008. On the one hand, the near collapse of the U.S. financial system and 
the rise of empowered shareholders have revived claims that short-
termism in response to market and shareholder pressure is a first-order 
governance problem that demands regulatory correction.16 On the other, 
shareholder advocates argue that short-termism is “insufficiently strong, 
empirically and theoretically, to affect corporate rulemaking,” defending 
the classic view that market prices are fairly information-efficient.17 
The short-term versus long-term contention has grown today into 
perhaps the most controversial debate in corporate governance. This Part 
provides the background necessary for understanding the context and 
importance of this debate, clarifying the different economic approaches to 
short-termism in the corporate context, as well as the debate’s wide-
ranging policy implications. 
A. Short-Termism: Arguments and Counterarguments 
 
1. Economic Literature 
 
Rational myopia provides the classical economic argument 
underpinning claims of short-termism in the corporate context. Two 
variations of this argument exist: “managerial myopia,” where short-
termism is a form of management opportunism, and “market myopia,” 
where short-termism is a consequence of asset pricing inefficiencies. 
Informational asymmetry, however, rests at the core of both myopia 
models. 
                                                     
 15. See, e.g., M.P. Narayanan, Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results, 40 J. FIN. 1469, 
1470 (1985) (“By selecting a project that yields short-term profits, the manager can expect to improve 
the perception about her ability . . . .”); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: 
A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q. J. ECON. 655, 667 (1989) [hereinafter Stein, Efficient 
Capital Markets] (modeling suboptimal investments where managers maximize a weighted average 
of near-term stock prices and long-run value); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial 
Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 63–67 (1988) [hereinafter Stein, Managerial Myopia] (showing formally 
that managers threatened by a takeover will sell underpriced assets). 
 16. See, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 
68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645 (2011); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? 
A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. 
REV. 449, 450–51 (2014). 
 17. See Roe, supra note 5, at 1004. See generally Bebchuk, The Myth, supra note 5. 
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Models of managerial myopia explore the distorted incentives of 
privately informed managers for inter-temporal choices that are 
individually optimal, but detrimental to shareholder and firm value. For 
example, managers may prefer projects that deliver short-term returns at 
the expense of long-term firm profitability because short-term returns are 
viewed as helpful to enhance the manager’s reputation,18 signal her 
superior ability in the labor market,19 or address issues of adverse 
selection.20  
Conversely, models of stock market myopia focus on the short-
termist distortions that arise from the informational asymmetry between 
managers and investors, which may cause market prices to fail to fully 
incorporate the value of long-term projects (or what Brennan refers to as 
“latent assets”21) in the short-term horizon.22 As a result, to avoid 
shareholder retribution (whether through managerial removal or a change 
in control) for what may appear as short-term underperformance, 
managers may trade off long-term cash flows for short-term stock price 
gains.23 
In practice, however, managerial myopia models and stock market 
myopia models tend to be complements rather than substitutes, with stock 
market’s short-termism reinforcing managerial short-termism and vice 
versa. For this reason, this Article conflates these alternative myopia 
characterizations into the unifying category of “myopia studies.” 
Unlike rational myopia scholars, defendants of the traditionally 
dominant view that market prices are fairly information-efficient argue 
that short-termist concerns have no, or at best little, room in corporate 
governance.24 Under this view, competitive markets optimize the trade-off 
between short-term performance and long-term investments,25 as stock 
prices are “generally set at levels representing the best estimate of long-
term share value that can be derived from all available public 
information.”26 This means that any course of action that is profitable in 
                                                     
 18. See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom & Joan Ricart I Costa, Managerial Incentives and Capital 
Management, 101 Q. J. ECON. 835 (1986); Narayanan, supra note 15, at 1470. 
 19. See Tim S. Campbell & Anthony M. Marino, Myopic Investment Decisions and Competitive 
Labor Markets, 35 INT’L ECON. REV. 855 (1994). 
 20. Simone M. Sepe, Board and Shareholder Power, Revisited, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1377, 1395–
1419 (2017) (examining the adverse selection issues arising in the shareholder–manager relationship). 
 21. See Michael J. Brennan, Latent Assets, 45 J. FIN. 709 (1990). 
 22. See generally Kenneth A. Froot et al., Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a 
Market with Short-Term Speculation, 47 J. FIN. 1461 (1992); Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 
Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not 
Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984). 
 23. See, e.g., Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 15, at 667. 
 24. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 5, at 1004. 
 25. See Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, 4 MIDLAND 
CORP. FIN. J., Summer 1986, at 6. 
 26. Bebchuk, The Myth, supra note 5, at 1661–62. 
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the long term will also tend to be profitable in the short term. 
Correspondently, any course of action that is bad in the long term can be 
expected to have similar negative effects in the short term. 
Two basic policy implications follow from these assumptions. First, 
maximizing today’s stock price is the best means to maximize a firm’s 
long-term value. Second, optimal inter-temporal choices are a condition 
for maximizing stock price. Therefore, when we observe, for example, a 
failure to invest in long-term projects, this choice should not be taken as a 
proxy of underinvestment in the long term, but rather as a value-
maximizing decision that reflects a lack of good long-term investment 
opportunities. 
2. Law & Economics Literature 
In the law and economics literature, the dominant explanation for 
short-termism focuses on liquidity needs rather than informational 
asymmetry. Under this explanation, short-termism results from the risk 
that “impatient” shareholders with short-term liquidity needs—and, 
therefore, a tendency to discount future gains and focus on short-term 
performance—might pressure companies to undertake investments that 
are lucrative in the short term, but value decreasing in the long run.27  
Although this explanation for short-termism has points in common 
with models of stock market myopia, it is important to emphasize that 
those models conceive of short-termism as a pervasive problem that 
potentially affects all shareholders. In contrast, the “impatient capital” 
explanation characterizes short-termist preferences as an issue affecting 
only a subset of investors. In particular, scholars have focused on 
institutional investors, as they have high turnover rates (to avoid holding 
large, undiversified blocks of stock28) and are under constant pressure to 
beat competitors.29 More recently, among institutional investors, the 
                                                     
 27. It appears that the first commentator to raise short-termism concerns was Martin Lipton. See 
Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. L. 101, 104–05 (1979); see also 
William T. Allen & Leo E. Strine, Jr., When the Existing Economic Order Deserves a Champion: The 
Enduring Relevance of Martin Lipton’s Vision of the Corporate Law, 60 BUS. L. 1383, 1383–84 (2005) 
(attributing to Lipton the view that traded securities are frequently mispriced). In more recent times, 
short-termism concerns have been raised by academics, organizational leaders, business columnists, 
corporate lawyers, and business organizations. See Bebchuk, The Myth, supra note 5, at 1639–40 nn.2–
6, 7–11 (collecting the most important contributions expressing short-termism concerns).   
 28. See S.M. Loescher, Bureaucratic Measurement, Shuttling Stock Shares, and Shortened Time 
Horizons: Implications for Economic Growth, 24 Q. REV. ECON. & BUS. 8, 9 (1984). 
 29. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 889–90 (2013) 
(describing the competitive-pressure mechanisms that affect the performance of institutional 
investors). 
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spotlight has been on hedge funds, whose business model is commonly 
oriented towards short-term gains.30 
In response, shareholder advocates argue that while institutional 
investors, including hedge funds, may occasionally raise short-termist 
concerns, the benefits arising from these investors’ activism and ability to 
efficiently exploit governance levers largely outweigh such concerns.31 
For shareholder advocates, activist institutional investors are the 
champions of the long-dormant shareholder franchise who, as the 
corporation’s residual claimants, are best positioned to control the first-
order problem of managerial moral hazard.32 Further, these scholars also 
reject the claim that activist institutional investors are at an informational 
disadvantage relative to boards of directors, arguing that this claim fails to 
take into account the increased sophistication of today’s investors. Indeed, 
institutional investors—and, in particular, hedge funds—would possess 
both the incentives and the resources to act as “governance entrepreneurs” 
that specialize in monitoring and providing governance and strategic 
inputs.33 And they could also rely on proxy advisory firms, which 
increasingly act as “central coordinating and information agents” to gather 
information regarding governance at particular firms.34 
B. The Legal Stakes  
The short-term versus long-term debate has wide-ranging legal 
implications. First and foremost, this debate has reignited discussions 
about the optimal allocation of power between boards and shareholders. 
Critics of short-termism argue that protecting the traditional board-
centric model of the corporation—by ensuring that directors are insulated 
from the pressure of activists—is necessary to prevent shareholders with 
excessive short-termist preferences from steering the corporation toward 
an unproductive short-term perspective.35 Enhanced board protection 
would be the most urgent in the current corporate scenario, where 
                                                     
30. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1083 (2007) (“Hedge funds come close to being the 
archetypal short-term investor. For some funds, holding shares for a full day represents a ‘long-term’ 
investment.”) (internal citation omitted). 
31. See Bebchuk et al., Long-Term Effects, supra note 6, at 1089.  
  32. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 449 (2001) (“[I]f the control rights granted to the firm’s equity-holders are exclusive 
and strong, they will have powerful incentives to maximize the value of the firm.”).   
 33. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 29, at 897. 
 34. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1007 (2010). 
 35. See, e.g., Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8, at 136–41.  
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shareholders have grown increasingly empowered 36 as a result of changes 
in both market practices and the regulatory landscape.37  
On the shareholder side, scholars rebut the urgency of short-termist 
concerns, which they view as “complicating factors” threatening to revert 
us to an inefficient system of opportunistic management insulation and 
shareholder disempowerment.38 Further, they contend, available empirical 
studies are decidedly unsupportive of both claims of pervasive short-
termism and the alleged benefits that management insulation would offer 
as a remedy to such concerns.39 In particular, contrary to what is argued 
by short-termist critics, the adoption of defensive measures—such as the 
staggered board and the poison pill—would be detrimental to shareholder 
and firm value, while hedge fund activism would increase firm value in 
both the short and long term.40 
For quite some time, shareholder advocates have been rather 
successful in employing empirical studies to advance the idea that a 
shareholder-centric model of the corporation is superior to a board-centric 
model.41 This explains, at least in part, the developments observed in 
market practices in the past decade and the regulatory reforms that were 
introduced to promote shareholder empowerment. The changes that 
occurred in the use of defensive measures provide perhaps the most telling 
evidence to this respect.42 While directors theoretically have a veto power 
over decisions to destagger boards, in recent years they have increasingly 
acquiesced to destaggering proposals under the pressure exerted by both 
proxy advisors and activist shareholders.43 The use of the poison pill has 
                                                     
36. See Martin Lipton et al., Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2016, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 9, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/09/ 
some-thoughts-for-boards-of -directors-in-2016 [https://perma.cc/9G8T-Z3JU]. 
37. Capital market changes have included the growth of shareholder concentration and 
activism, the rise of activist hedge funds, the emergence of proxy advisory firms, new universal 
majority voting and accompanying withhold campaigns, and the growing use and success of 
shareholder proposals. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8, at 85. Regulatory reforms have 
accompanied these changes, including amendments to proxy filing requirements that facilitate the 
use of shareholder proposals, amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law that grant 
shareholders greater access to the ballot box, and most recently, the introduction of say-on-pay 
shareholder votes and a further expansion of the scope of shareholder proposals to effect changes in 
corporate election procedures. See id. at 86. 
 38. See Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 1651; Roe, supra note 5, at 1004–05. 
 39. See Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 1644, 1686–87. 
 40. See id. at 1652–56 (arguing that the available empirical evidence documents a negative effect 
of defensive measures on firm value); Bebchuk et al., supra note 6, at 1090 (documenting evidence 
against the alleged reversal of the positive effect of hedge fund activism in the long term). 
41. See Cremers, Masconale & Sepe, supra note 10, at 744–45. 
 42. See Sepe, supra note 20, at 1394–95. 
43. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8, at 98–99 (documenting that lower staggered board 
levels over time are largely due to increased destaggering rather than a fall in staggering events).  
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similarly declined—again, largely as a result of the war waged against it 
by proxy advisors and activist investors.44 
In more recent times, however, short-termist critics have produced 
new evidence that challenges prior economic studies, suggesting that, at 
least for some firms, board protection from shareholder and market 
pressure may be value increasing, while enhanced shareholder activism 
may have detrimental consequences.45 These studies have accordingly 
prompted (or in some cases, revived) reform proposals designed to re-
empower boards—vis-à-vis shareholders—including proposals to grant 
directors terms of three or five years,46 enhance the voting rights of long-
term holders,47 impose sticky default rules that embed staggered boards,48 
and regulate the voting choices of money managers.49 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR BEHAVIOR: AN OVERVIEW 
 
                                                     
44. Stephen M. Gill et al., Structural Defenses to Shareholder Activism, 47 REV. SEC. & 
COMMODITIES REG. 151, 170 n.162 (2014) (“Whereas 57% of the S&P 500 companies had poison 
pills at the end of 2003, only 7% had pills in place at the end of 2013.”) (internal citation omitted).  
 45. See, e.g., K.J. Martijn  Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Activist Hedge Funds 
and the Corporation, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 261, 298–303 (2017) (documenting that hedge fund 
activism is not associated to reduced agency costs while it is associated to increased risk taking); 
William C. Johnson, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Sangho Yi, The Bonding Hypothesis of Takeover 
Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 307, 308 (2015) (showing that staggered 
boards have a positive effect on firm value in young firms with important stakeholder relationships); 
David F. Larcker, Gaizka Ormazabal & Daniel J. Taylor, The Market Reaction to Corporate 
Governance Regulation, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 433 (2011) (showing a negative stock return around 
proposal announcements for proxy access reform, including a proposal to eliminate staggered boards, 
which is “inconsistent with the market viewing the elimination of staggered boards as value 
increasing”); Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8 (documenting a value-increasing effect of staggered 
boards); Cremers, Litov & Sepe, supra note 13 (producing additional empirical tests on the value-
increasing effect of staggered boards); Cremers et al., supra note 6 (empirically challenging the view 
that hedge fund activism is beneficial in the long term). 
 46. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great  Takeover Debate: A 
Mediation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1097 (2002) (proposing a 
triennial board election); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate 
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 225–30  (1991) 
(proposing a quinquennial board election); Jacobs, supra note 16, at 1648, 1662 (proposing a 
quinquennial board election). 
 47. See, e.g., COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND 
HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT (2013) (proposing greater voting rights for long-term shareholders); 
Patrick Bolton & Frédéric Samama, L-Shares: Rewarding Long-Term Investors 3, 39 (European Corp. 
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 342/2013, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2188661## (proposing option grants to shareholders made exercisable only 
after holder meets long-term ownership time threshold). 
 48. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8, at 137–41 (proposing a default rule favoring staggered 
boards that can be removed only by the board of directors). 
 49. See Strine, Jr., supra note 16, at 450–51 (requiring index funds and mutual funds to vote their 
shares to support long-term value creation). 
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In our prior work, we examined explanations for short-termism based 
on informational asymmetry, which produced theoretical and empirical 
results that are consistent with the view that short-termist concerns are 
real.50 In this Article, we proceed in another direction, focusing on 
impatient capital explanations and in particular, examining empirically the 
aggregate behavior of institutional investors. Two main reasons motivate 
our research. First, we maintain that short-termist explanations based on 
myopia studies may coexist with impatient capital explanations and in fact, 
overlap. Second, despite the fierce debate around the alleged virtues or 
vices of institutional investors in corporate governance, the law and 
economics literature has paid relatively little attention to the aggregate 
behavior of these investors so far, relying more on theoretical predictions 
than empirical research. 
In this Part, after presenting our dataset, we begin our empirical 
analysis of aggregate institutional investor behavior by describing the time 
trends in institutional ownership over the past three decades.  
A. Data Description 
 
We use several proxies to capture the different dimensions of 
aggregate institutional investor behavior. For institutional investors’ 
holding durations, we use three proxies: Institutional Duration, 
Institutional Portfolio Duration, and Institutional Turnover. All three 
proxies are derived from Thomson-Reuters and based on the 13F 
institutional holdings reports (13F forms) that institutional investors are 
required to file quarterly. For institutional investor activism, we use one 
proxy: Institutional Active Share.  
The first proxy of institutional investors’ holding durations, 
Institutional Duration, measures how long the current institutional owners 
have held that particular stock in their portfolio over the last five years 
(averaged by each institution’s share ownership in the stock).51 Therefore, 
Institutional Duration only considers how long institutions have held a 
particular stock in their respective portfolios, irrespective of how long they 
hold any of the other stocks in their portfolio. This proxy captures the 
evidence that institutions might be short-term in some stocks and long-
term in other stocks, reflecting the fact that, at many large institutions, 
                                                     
 50. See, e.g., Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8 (producing empirical evidence that the adoption of 
a staggered board is beneficial to address short-termist concerns); Sepe, supra note 20 (showing 
theoretically that the problem of adverse selection makes short-termism a pervasive problem). 
 51. This measure was first introduced in a 2015 study by K.J. Martijn Cremers and Ankur Pareek. 
See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Ankur Pareek, Short-Term Trading and Stock Return Anomalies: 
Momentum, Reversal, and Share Issuance, 19 REV. FIN. 1649, 1650–51 (2015). 
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different portfolio managers make investment decisions for very different 
reasons. 
The second proxy, Institutional Portfolio Duration, measures how 
long the current institutional owners have held stocks in general (not just 
the particular stock in question) in their portfolio over the last five years 
(averaged by each institution’s share ownership in the stock). Institutional 
Portfolio Duration is first calculated at the level of each institution, based 
on how long the aggregate institutional portfolio has held all of its stocks 
over the past five years, averaged by the portfolio weights in each stock. 
Therefore, this proxy characterizes the whole institutional portfolio rather 
than only the institution’s behavior in the particular stock in question. 
Institutional Portfolio Duration is then calculated as the weighted average 
of this institutional holding duration across all institutions owning the 
stock.52 While the 13F holdings reports start in 1980, we require at least 
three years of institutional holdings reports before including the 
institution, such that both the Institutional Duration and Institutional 
Portfolio Duration data series’ start in 1983, and, like all the proxies we 
use in our analysis, end in 2015. 
The third proxy, Institutional Turnover, calculates the amount of 
trading done by the current institutional owners as an average percentage 
of quarterly portfolio holding changes in the past year (averaged by each 
institution’s share ownership in the stock). This proxy is the most widely 
used for institutional trading frequency and is similar to the inverse of 
Institutional Portfolio Duration. A distinction of Institutional Turnover is 
that it does not matter which of the total assets are turned over but only 
how many of the institutional assets are turned over. As a result, this proxy 
does not distinguish between turnover where the institution sells shares it 
acquired only in the previous quarter versus where the institution sells 
shares it acquired ten years ago.53 In contrast, this difference is taken into 
account when calculating Institutional Portfolio Duration.54 Therefore, 
two funds may have the same Institutional Turnover but very different 
Institutional Portfolio Duration.55 
                                                     
 52. This measure was first introduced in a 2016 study by K.J. Martin Cremers and Ankur Pareek. 
See K.J. Martin Cremers & Ankur Pareek, Patient Capital Outperformance: The Investment Skill of 
High Active Share Managers Who Trade Infrequently, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 288, 291–92 (2016). 
53. Id. 
 54. For a detailed discussion and comparison of these measures of investment time horizons as 
applied to mutual funds rather than institutional investors, see Anne M. Tucker, The Long & The Short: 
An Empirical Study of Mutual Fund Investment Time Horizons, 43 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2017). 
55. For example, consider an institution that never trades 75% of its portfolio and turns over 
the remaining 25% of its portfolio each quarter, such that it has an annualized turnover of 100% per 
year. This turnover would be the same as an institution that turns over the full portfolio once a year. 
However, the former portfolio would have a long holding duration, on average, while the latter 
portfolio would have a holding duration of one year only.  
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Finally, Institutional Active Share is a proxy of the percentage 
difference between the overall holdings’ weights of the current 
institutional owners and market weights. We first calculate the active share 
of each institution owning a particular stock, using their overall portfolio, 
and then average over each institution’s share ownership in the stock. 
Active share is the percentage of weights in the portfolio that differ from 
the weights in the portfolio’s benchmark. For example, an active share of 
50% indicates that half of the portfolio’s weights completely overlap with 
the weights in the portfolio’s benchmark. In assigning benchmarks to each 
institutional portfolio, we select the benchmark for which the institutional 
portfolio has the lowest active share out of a large set of potential 
benchmarks used by U.S. mutual funds.56 As a result, the assigned 
benchmark has the largest overlap with the institutional portfolio across 
all reasonable, frequently used U.S. equity benchmarks. 
B. Time Trends in Institutional Ownership 
 
In this Section, we provide a description of the time trends in 
institutional ownership over the past thirty-five years, from 1980 to 2015, 
focusing on institutional ownership levels, Institutional Duration, 
Institutional Turnover, and Institutional Active Share (all as defined in Part 
II.A). 
1. Institutional Ownership Levels 
 
As discussed in Part I.B, the growth of institutional ownership is 
considered one of the crucial factors contributing to shareholder 
empowerment. Accordingly, we begin our analysis by examining the 
percentage of outstanding equity held by institutional investors throughout 
our sample period, reporting their 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles, 
respectively.  
Consistent with prior studies,57 we document that the percentage of 
institutional ownership holdings has dramatically increased since 1980. As 
shown by Figure 1, if we consider, for example, the 50th percentile (i.e., 
the median) of institutional ownership holdings, the median was only 6% 
in 1980. This means that as of 1980, half the outstanding stocks had 
institutional ownership of 6% or below, and the other half had institutional 
ownership above 6%. The median progressively escalated to around 30% 
                                                     
 56. This measure was first introduced in a 2009 study by K.J. Martijn Cremers and Antti 
Petajisto. See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active Is Your Fund Manager? A New 
Measure that Predicts Performance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329 (2009). 
 57. See, e.g., Black, supra note 1; Kahan & Rock, supra note 34, at 987. 
402 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:387 
at the beginning of the 1990s and then further increased through the 1990s 
and 2000s up to a record high of 81% in 2012.  
The pattern in the 70th percentile of institutional ownership holdings 
is similar, with the 70th percentile being around 27% in the early 1980s 
and up to around 90% in 2010. Likewise, the 90th percentile of 
institutional ownership increased from 46% in 1980 to 99% in 2009. 
 
Figure 1 
Institutional Ownership Holdings 
 
Figure 1 plots the 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles (perc.) of the percentage of 
outstanding equity held by institutional owners, as derived from the Thomson-
Reuters 13F quarterly institutional holdings reports for the period 1980–2015. 
 
 
2. Institutional Duration 
 
Next, we consider our first proxy of how long institutional investors 
hold stocks in their portfolios: Institutional Duration, which measures the 
weighted average length of time (in years) that investors have held a given 
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stock over the past five years. A common claim in the impatient capital 
explanation for short-termism is that institutional investors have evolved 
into short-term traders. Investigating whether Institutional Duration has 
changed in the past three decades is thus important to verify the potential 
for distortions due to the presence of short-term institutional investors.58 
As shown by Figure 2 below—and contrary to commonly held 
beliefs—Institutional Duration has increased since the 1980s. For 
example, the 50th percentile of Institutional Duration has lengthened from 
1.38 years in 1983 to 1.93 years in 2015. Consistently, the 70th percentile 
of Institutional Duration has lengthened from 1.63 years in 1984 to 2.02 
years in 2015.  
The increase in Institutional Duration was first documented in a 
2016 study by Martijn Cremers and Ankur Pareek.59 This result may seem 
surprising in light of the very large increases in share turnover over the 
period under examination.60 However, the increased investment horizons 
of institutional investors are also evident from the patterns in institutional 
turnover. Furthermore, increased investment horizons are consistent with 
the patterns in the durations and turnovers of U.S. mutual funds, when one 
uses funds’ turnovers that are based on all fund trading61 (rather than only 
on quarterly holdings reports as in this paper, which ignores any round-
trip trades done within the quarter). Lengthening institutional investment 
horizons are also consistent with the significant increase in passive 
investing, and indicate that the large increases in share turnover is caused 
by other investors (such as high-frequency traders) rather than the 





Figure 2 plots the 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles (perc.) of Institutional 
Duration, which is a proxy of the length of time (in years) that the current 
institutional owners have held a particular stock in their portfolio over the last five 
years (averaged by each institution’s share ownership in the stock), as derived 
from the Thomson-Reuters 13F quarterly institutional holdings reports for the 
period 1980–2015. 
 
                                                     
 58. As the distribution of Institutional Portfolio Duration is basically identical to the distribution 
of Institutional Duration, we only display the percentiles for Institutional Duration. In the annual 
pooled panel, Institutional Duration has correlations of 56% and -43%, respectively, with Institutional 
Portfolio Duration and Institutional Turnover. 
 59. See Cremers & Pareek, supra note 52, at 293. 
60. See id. at 294. 
61. See id. 
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3. Institutional Turnover 
To verify the claim that institutional investors have evolved into 
short-term traders, we then employ our additional proxy of institutional 
investors’ holding periods: Institutional Turnover, which is a measure of 
trading frequency based on previous changes in quarter-end holdings.  
Consistent with the evidence on Institutional Duration in Figure 2 
above, Figure 3 shows that the percentiles of Institutional Turnover have 
not changed significantly since the 1980s, supporting the view that 
institutional investors have not grown more impatient over time. In fact, 
the median Institutional Turnover decreased slightly from 33% per quarter 






Figure 3 plots the 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles (perc.) of quarterly 
Institutional Turnover, which is a proxy of the amount of trading done by the 
current institutional owners. Such data is calculated as the average percentage of 
quarterly portfolio holding changes in the past year (averaged by each institution’s 
share ownership in the stock), as derived from the Thomson-Reuters 13F quarterly 
institutional holdings reports for the period 1980–2015. 
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4. Institutional Active Investing 
Next, we focus on time trends in institutional investor activism in our 
sample period. As a proxy of activism, we use Institutional Active Share, 
which is a measure distinguishing between actively managed institutional 
holdings and holdings that are fairly similar to market benchmarks. 
Indeed, another standard claim underpinning the impatient capital 
explanation for short-termism is that greater shareholder activism has 
increased the potential for short-termist concerns.62 The claim is that 
activist investors—who take significant stakes in target companies, 
generally have concentrated portfolios, and thus have a high active share—
are intrinsically better positioned to pressure management toward lucrative 
short-term projects at the expense of long-term value.63 
                                                     
62. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: 
Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and 
Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. L. no. 1, 2010, at 1, 8 (2010); Bill George, Activists Seek Short-Term Gain, 
Not Long-Term Value, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 26, 2013, 10:56 AM), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/activists-seek-short-term-gain-not-long-term-value/ 
[https://perma.cc/JKK5-Z7NL]. 
63. See, e.g., ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE 
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Yet, as shown by Figure 4 below, we find that institutional investor 
activism has decreased in the past three decades. For example, the median 
Institutional Active Share was 61% in 1980 but dropped to 47% in 2014. 
Similarly, the 70th percentile of Institutional Active Share equaled 66% in 
1980 but dropped to 52% in 2015. Lastly, in the 90th percentile of 
Institutional Active Share, the group of stocks with the most active 
institutional investors went from 75% in 1980 to 59% in 2015. 
Figure 4 
Institutional Active Share 
 
Figure 4 plots the 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles of Institutional Active 
Share, which is a proxy of the percentage difference between the overall holdings 
weights of the current institutional owners and market weights. We first calculate 
the active share of each institution owning a particular stock, using their overall 
portfolio, and then average over each institution’s share ownership in the stock, 
as derived from the Thomson-Reuters 13F quarterly institutional holdings reports 
for the period 1980–2015. 
 
EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT HORIZONS AND 
ACTIVISM 
The evidence discussed in Part II indicates that while institutional 
investor ownership has significantly increased in the past three decades, 
institutional investors seem to have grown more patient and less active. 
This finding runs contrary to common assumptions about 
institutional investors. Under these assumptions, institutional investors as 
a whole would have transitioned from a “defensive” use of corporate 
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governance levers to a more proactive use of such levers after the rise of 
hedge funds.64 
In this Part, we accordingly seek to understand what factors, if any, 
can explain institutional holding behavior and activism. We do so by 
investigating whether different firm characteristics can predict different 
aggregate investor behavior. 
A. Explaining Institutional Duration, Turnover, and Activism 
In the attempt to understand what factors might predict institutional 
investor behavior, we proceed by estimating R2 values from regressing our 
three proxies for institutional investment horizon (Institutional Turnover, 
Institutional Duration, and Institutional Portfolio Duration in columns 1–
3, respectively) and activism (Institutional Active Share in column 4) on a 
constant plus different fixed effects (year, industry at the 2-digit SIC group 
level, firm), or a set of sixteen different firm characteristics (including all 
our control variables in Table 2 below, except the proxies for institutional 
investor horizon and activism). 
An R2 value analysis measures the degree through which the 
independent variables in a model explain the dependent variables. 
Therefore, this methodology should allow us to better understand how 
institutional investor behavior varies depending on exact years, industry 
or time-invariant firm characteristics, and specific and time-varying firm 
characteristics. Table 1 shows our results. 
 
Table 1 
Explaining the Presence of Short-term and Active Institutions  
 
The table presents the R2 of regressing three proxies of institutional 
investment horizons (Institutional Turnover, Institutional Duration, and 
Institutional Portfolio Duration in columns 1–3, respectively) and our proxy of 
institutional investor activism (Institutional Active Share in column 4) on a 
constant plus different fixed effects (year, industry at the 2-digit SIC group level, 
firm), or a set of sixteen different firm characteristics (see text). Each R2 results 














Year F.E. 6% 22% 12% 16% 
                                                     
 64. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder 
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 87 (2011). 
 
408 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:387 
Year + Industry 
F.E. 
27% 38% 24% 33% 
Year + Firm F.E. 57% 63% 46% 66% 
Year + Firm F.E. 
+ Firm-
Characteristics 
59% 67% 50% 69% 
N 25,134 25,090 26,724 26,709 
 
As shown in column 1, the R2 of regressing Institutional Duration on 
year fixed effects is 6%, meaning that differences in years explain 6% of 
the differences in Institutional Duration. When we calculate the R2 of 
regressing Institutional Duration on industry fixed effects, the R2 estimate 
increases significantly, with differences in industries explaining 27% of 
the differences in Institutional Duration. The increase in R2 is even more 
significant when we calculate the R2 of regressing Institutional Duration 
on firm fixed effects, with differences in unobservable firm characteristics 
explaining 57% of the differences in Institutional Duration. However, 
when we calculate the R2 of regressing Institutional Duration on firm fixed 
effects plus the set of our sixteen specific firm characteristics, the R2 only 
increases from 57% to 59%. This suggests that there are no observable 
firm characteristics that can uniformly predict variations in Institutional 
Duration. 
Results for Institutional Portfolio Duration, shown in column 2, are 
similar, although generally of greater magnitude. In particular, compared 
to the R2 only considering unobservable firm characteristics, the R2 of 
regressing Institutional Portfolio Duration on firm fixed effects plus the 
set of our sixteen firm characteristics increases only by 4% (from 63% to 
67%). This confirms that employing the set of observable firm 
characteristics adds relatively little to explanatory power. 
Results for Institutional Turnover, shown in column 3, indicate, 
again, that time-invariant firm characteristics explain most of the variation 
in the presence of short-term versus long-term institutional investors. 
However, the increase in the R2 we obtain when we regress Institutional 
Turnover on firm fixed effects compared to the R2 we obtain using industry 
fixed effects is not as significant as in the cases of Institutional Duration 
and Institutional Portfolio Duration. Specifically, the R2 using industry 
fixed effects is 24%, and the R2 using firm fixed effects is 46%. This result 
indicates that industry related factors might play a more important role in 
explaining the frequency of institutional trading than they do in explaining 
institutional holding periods. Still, consistent with the results we obtain for 
Institutional Duration and Institutional Portfolio Duration, when we 
calculate the R2 of regressing Institutional Turnover on firm fixed effects 
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plus the set of our sixteen firm characteristics, R2 registers, again, only a 
4% increase (from 46% to 50%). 
Results for Institutional Active Share are also similar, with 
differences in time-invariant firm characteristics explaining 66% of the 
differences in the activism of institutional investors and the R2 of 
regressing Institutional Active Share on firm characteristics and firm fixed 
effects only increasing to 69%. Therefore, as with institutional holding 
periods, there seem to be no time-varying firm characteristics that have 
substantial additional explanatory power for how active a stock’s 
institutional investor will be relative to time-invariant firm fixed effects. 
Since our firm characteristics also include staggered boards and 
poison pills, these results suggest that contrary to commonly held beliefs, 
the adoption of such measures does not seem to be related to the presence 
of either short-term or long-term institutional investment horizons or more 
or less active institutions. 
B. Individual Firm Characteristics 
In order to analyze the importance at the margin of time variation in 
specific firm characteristics, we next turn to more closely examine the 
relationship between our set of sixteen firm characteristics and both 
institutional investment horizon and activism. 
To this end, in Table 2, we present pooled panel regressions (i.e., 
with firm fixed effects) of our three proxies for institutional investment 
horizon (Institutional Turnover, Institutional Duration, and Institutional 
Portfolio Duration in columns 1–3, respectively) and activism 
(Institutional Active Share in column 4) on the set of our specific firm 
characteristics. 
Table 2 
Institutional Investor Behavior and Firm Characteristics 
 
This table presents regressions of three different proxies of the presence of 
short-term institutions (Institutional Duration, Institutional Portfolio Duration, 
and Institutional Turnover in columns 1–3, respectively) and of active institutions 
(Institutional Active Share in column 4) on a large set of firm characteristics (see 
text), which are lagged by one year. Each regression includes year and firm fixed 
effects. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively, based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.  
 










Tobin's Q -0.0139** -0.0187*** 0.00674*** -0.00950*** 
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(-2.57) (-7.70) (8.90) (-12.31) 
Staggered 
Board 
-0.00231 -0.0000306 -0.00405 0.00334 
 
(-0.10) (-0.00) (-1.47) (1.08) 
Poison Pill -0.0387*** -0.0142** 0.00454*** 0.00249  




-0.239** -0.744*** 0.232*** 
 

















-0.210*** -0.0761*** 0.00251 0.0272*** 
(-5.56) (-5.03) (0.59) (5.28) 
Log(Assets) -0.00884 0.0142** -0.0120*** -0.0173*** 
(-0.54) (2.22) (-6.42) (-8.99) 
Log(Firm 
Age) 
0.586*** 0.150*** -0.0370*** -0.0151** 
(12.61) (7.50) (-5.81) (-2.33) 
Herfindahl 
Industry 
-0.0290 -0.0153 0.00466 -0.00511 
 
(-0.74) (-0.97) (0.94) (-1.03) 
Sales 
growth 
-0.0706*** -0.0689*** 0.0199*** -0.00138 
(-4.31) (-10.31) (7.34) (-0.56) 
Loss 0.00765 0.0243*** -0.00589*** 0.00749*** 
(0.80) (6.13) (-3.70) (5.40) 
Debt-to-
Equity 
-0.00767** -0.00264* 0.00101* 0.000309 
(-2.20) (-1.75) (1.88) (0.57) 
Firm 
Liquidity 
-0.0915* -0.0245 0.00220 -0.0194** 
(-1.86) (-1.22) (0.35) (-2.51) 
CAPX / 
Assets 
-0.176 0.0808 -0.0551*** -0.00160 
(-1.46) (1.57) (-3.14) (-0.09) 
R&D / 
Assets 
-0.00169 -0.0160 0.00573 -0.00156 
(-0.11) (-1.41) (1.27) (-0.22) 




0.0115 -0.0167 0.00698* -0.000929 
 
(0.39) (-1.34) (1.69) (-0.21) 
Large 
Customer 
-0.0152 -0.00541 -0.000117 0.000408 
 
(-1.24) (-1.12) (-0.08) (0.25) 
Log(# of 
Patents) 
0.0181 0.0145* -0.00154 -0.00380 
 
(0.88) (1.73) (-0.60) (-1.51) 
 
 
N 25,119 25,075 26,709 25,071 
R-sq 0.588 0.670 0.501 0.711 
 
Among the noticeable results of Table 2, we find that higher firm 
value (as proxied by Tobin’s Q) predicts shorter institutional holding 
periods and correspondently higher stock turnover, while also being 
correlated to less activism. This seems to indicate that as a firm’s value 
increases, investors trade stock more frequently, perhaps in order to 
exploit profit opportunities. Economically, a standard deviation increase 
in firm value (corresponding to an increase in Tobin’s Q of 1.27) is 
associated with a decrease in Institutional Portfolio Duration of 0.28 
months (=1.27*0.0187*12, see column 2) and with a decrease in 
Institutional Active Share of 1.2% (=1.27*0.0095, see column 4). 
Results concerning the adoption of defensive measures are also 
noticeable. First, we find that staggered boards have no impact on any of 
our measures of institutional investor behavior.  
Conversely, poison pills seem to predict increased short-termism on 
the side of investors, as their adoption is associated with lower 
Institutional Duration, lower Institutional Portfolio Duration, and 
increased Institutional Turnover. Considering that the adoption of a poison 
pill is designed to block threats of a change in control, this result might 
seem puzzling at first. Poison pill results, however, need to be interpreted 
with caution. Indeed, since boards of directors can unilaterally adopt a pill 
at any time, it is difficult to gather any inference about the use of “visible” 
rather than “shadow” pills.65 Nevertheless, because boards tend to put a 
pill in place when things have already gone awry, institutional investors 
                                                     
65. See John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the 
Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 288 (2000) (arguing that since the endorsement of the pill 
by Delaware courts, “all Delaware firms . . . have had a shadow pill in place, witting or not”). 
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could interpret their adoption as a “bad” signal, which would explain why 
the poison pill is associated with a shorter institutional investment horizon.  
Alternatively, as we have explained elsewhere,66 the negative 
association between firms with a pill in place and institutional investment 
horizons could be explained by the unilateral nature of this defensive 
measure. Unlike staggered boards, which require shareholder approval, 
the adoption of a pill requires no dialectical confrontation with the 
shareholders and, therefore, may have a higher likelihood of being 
motivated by managerial moral hazard. This would explain why 
institutional investors tend to react negatively to the adoption of a pill but 
remain indifferent to the adoption of a staggered board. 
Next, moving to the impact of having more active institutional 
investors, we find that in firms with a greater Institutional Active Share, 
the institutional investment horizon is considerably reduced. That is, a 
greater Institutional Active Share is associated with a decrease in 
Institutional Duration and Institutional Portfolio Duration and an increase 
in Institutional Turnover. This result seems consistent with the claim that 
increased shareholder activism is likely to exacerbate short-termist 
concerns, as activism would increase the ability of investors to pressure 
managers to undertake strategies with lucrative short-term projects at the 
expense of long-term value. Indeed, while we develop our value analysis 
in the next Part, Table 2 results seem to preliminarily indicate that the more 
active a firm’s institutional investors are, the more short-term they tend to 
be.  
Consistently, as to the impact of the levels of institutional ownership, 
we observe that higher institutional ownership levels are associated with 
lower holding periods as well as greater activism. This result, thus, seems 
to confirm the inference that active investors may enjoy greater bargaining 
power to influence a firm’s time horizon and that this power increases with 
the level of outstanding stock held by the institutional investor. 
Finally, Table 2 shows that firm age is associated with longer 
duration, less turnover, and less activism. A possible explanation for this 
result is that investors in older firms are better positioned to gather private 
information throughout the years. This positional advantage would reduce 
the informational asymmetry gap between insiders and outsiders in older 
firms. Under the assumption that informational asymmetry is a factor 
causing investors to be more short-term-oriented, the reduced 
informational asymmetry gap of older firms could then explain why 
institutional investors tend to have longer investment horizons, as well as 
why they tend to interfere less with management in such firms. 
                                                     
 66. See Cremers, Masconale & Sepe, supra note 10, at 769. 
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INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND FIRM VALUE 
 
So far, the results of our empirical investigation indicate that more 
institutional investor activism is associated with shorter institutional 
holding periods and more frequent institutional trading. Further, the higher 
the levels of institutional ownership, the more the institutional activism 
and the shorter the institutional investment horizon. Conversely, in older 
firms, we observe less activism and turnover on the one hand and longer 
holding periods on the other. Still, in contrast to common theoretical 
predictions, different defense measures seem to have a varying impact on 
institutional investor behavior. 
These results, however, do not address efficiency questions about 
institutional investor behavior. In order to address these questions, in this 
Part, we focus on the financial value analysis of aggregate institutional 
investor behavior as interacted with corporate governance features. We do 
so by estimating Tobin’s Q regressions on year and firm fixed effects, 
proxies for institutional investment horizons and activism, staggered 
boards, poison pills, and a set of standard controls. As shown by Table 3 
below, we use different proxies for institutional investment horizons in 
different columns. In columns 1–5, we use Institutional Duration; in 
column 6, we use Institutional Portfolio Duration; and in column 7, we 
use Institutional Turnover. 
 
Table 3 
Firm Value, Governance, and Institutional Shareholders 
 
This table presents Tobin’s Q regressions on year and firm fixed effects, 
proxies for the presence of short-term institutions (Institutional Duration, 
Institutional Portfolio Duration, and Institutional Turnover), a proxy of the 
presence of active institutions (Institutional Active Share), staggered boards (SB), 
poison pills (PP), plus a set of standard controls.67 All independent variables are 
lagged by one year. The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                                                     
 67. For brevity, we do not show the controls in the Table.  




Institutional Duration Inst. Portf. 
Duration 
Inst. Turn. 
   
Staggered 
Board 
0.103** 0.0275 0.104** 0.0241 0.0501 0.0489 0.0542 
 
(2.16) (0.57) (2.18) (0.50) (1.16) (1.16) (1.41) 
Poison Pill -0.0590** -0.0566* -0.0256 -0.0136 0.00248 0.000854 0.00210 
 










(2.25) (2.36) (2.44) (1.83) (1.66) 
Poison Pill 
* 








-0.725** -1.027 -1.602*** 




















-0.127 -0.102 -0.383*** 




-0.308* 0.0654 -1.891** 










0.00626 -0.0114 0.437 
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-0.00715 -0.0423* 0.00211 -0.0322 -0.0181 -0.312 -0.679 
 











(3.51) (3.58) (3.51) (3.57) (4.07) (3.87) (4.73) 
N 24,830 23,655 24,830 23,655 23,551 23,509 26,322 
R-sq 0.660 0.663 0.660 0.663 0.666 0.667 0.662 
 
Our first finding, consistent with robust results we obtained in prior 
research,68 is that the adoption of a staggered board is associated with 
increased firm value. For example, the results in column 1 indicate that an 
adoption or removal of a staggered board is associated with an average 
increase or decrease in Tobin’s Q of 10.3%, which is economically 
meaningful with an average Tobin’s Q in our sample of 1.83.  Conversely, 
but still consistent with our prior research,69 the adoption of the poison pill 
is associated with reduced firm value. This reinforces our prior inference 
that we observe shorter institutional investment horizons in firms with a 
poison pill perhaps because the adoption of a unilateral defensive 
mechanism, such as the pill, signals a higher likelihood of managerial 
moral hazard. 
Our most notable result in relation to the use of defensive measures 
is that the adoption of a staggered board becomes more valuable in the 
presence of patient capital, as indicated by the strongly significant positive 
coefficient we obtain for Staggered Board*Proxy of Investment Horizon 
in column 2 (in which we use Institutional Duration to measure 
institutional holding periods). Economically, we can compare the 
associated change in Tobin’s Q of adopting a staggered board for firms 
with different levels of institutional investment horizon. For example, 
compare a firm with average Institutional Duration (equal to 1.48 years) 
to a firm where Institutional Duration is a standard deviation (0.57) higher 
(equal to 1.48+0.57 = 2.05 years). The results in column 2 suggest that the 
adoption of a staggered board is associated with an increase in Tobin’s Q 
                                                     
 68. See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 8, at 100–05; Cremers, Litov & Sepe, supra note 13. 
 69. See Cremers, Masconale & Sepe, supra note 10, at 769, 772–74. 
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of 12.3% for firms with average Institutional Duration70 and with an 
increase in Tobin’s Q of 16% for firms where Institutional Duration is a 
standard deviation higher.71 This result is also robust to using other proxies 
of investment horizon as shown by columns 6 and 7 (respectively 
documenting results for Institutional Portfolio Duration and Institutional 
Turnover). 
The results on the increased value of adopting a staggered board in 
the presence of more patient institutional capital are, again, consistent with 
the results we obtained in our prior staggered board research.72 This 
research shows that the staggered board serves a constructive governance 
function, as the limits it imposes on the ability of shareholders to intervene 
in corporate decision-making result from mutual agreement between the 
board and the shareholders.73 This function commits shareholders to 
preserve a board’s authority to exploit competitive private information in 
the short term when it is more likely that market prices may fail to fully 
incorporate such information (and, therefore, fail to serve as an efficient 
information focal point for shareholder governance interventions).74 
Under this view, the fact that firms with a staggered board and more 
patient investors exhibit successful financial performance confirms 
staggered boards add value by ensuring that investors give managers 
sufficient time to develop latent assets (that is, long-term strategies), rather 
than evaluate managerial performance after relatively briefs periods of 
time. 
Conversely, the adoption of a poison pill continues to be negatively 
associated with firm value even when combined with patient capital as 
shown by the negative coefficient we obtain for Poison Pill*Proxy of 
Investment Horizon in column 3 (in which we use Institutional Duration 
to measure institutional holding periods). This finding provides additional 
confirmation to our inference that poison pills, as unilateral devices that 
are not the result of an agreement with shareholders, are more likely to 
reflect managerial moral hazard. 
The other major result we obtain in examining the financial value 
impact of institutional investor behavior and corporate governance 
features is that when investors have longer investment horizons but are 
more active, the positive effect of the staggered board on firm value 
decreases (although the overall effect remains positive). As shown in 
column 5 (in which we use Institutional Duration to measure institutional 
holding periods), the coefficient for Institutional Active Share*Staggered 
                                                     
 70. The percentage estimated is obtained as follows: 2.75%+(0.0646*1.48) = 12.3%. 
 71. The percentage estimated is obtained as follows: 2.75%+(0.0646*2.05) = 16%. 
 72. See Cremers, Masconale & Sepe, supra note 10, at 769–71.  
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. 
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Board*Proxy of Investment Horizon is negative. A possible interpretation 
of this result is that when investors show signs of impatience by being 
more active, the relationship between the board of directors and the 
shareholders is disrupted and falls out of the equilibrium path, so the 
staggered board can no longer serve a constructive function and commit 
investors to the longer term. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Our analysis of aggregate institutional investor behavior has 
generated insights on the short-term versus long-term debate in corporate 
governance, in addition to providing a framework for future work on 
institutional investor behavior. First, our study suggests that as empirical 
results need to be convincingly interpreted through theoretical 
explanations, so too do theoretical predictions need to be verified through 
an examination of the empirical evidence when data is available. Indeed, 
far from the picture of homogenously “good” or “bad” institutional 
investors commonly depicted by contenders in the short- versus long-term 
debate, we find that different firm characteristics are associated with 
different investor behaviors. We also find that institutional investors’ 
attitudes toward activism play a role in influencing investment horizon 
preferences. 
Second, our results call for further research into the individual classes 
of institutional investors and the relationship existing between governance 
features and both aggregate and individual institutional behavior. For 
example, the evidence that active institutional investors exhibit more 
short-term preferences seems in line with prior results we obtained on 
hedge fund behavior.75 This suggests that studying the behavior of other 
classes of institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies, 
mutual funds, and the like, against the benchmark of aggregate 
institutional behavior could help further our understanding of the role 
played by institutional ownership in the corporation’s inter-temporal 
choices. 
Third, our results suggest that further investigation of the dynamics 
linking firm and governance characteristics to both aggregate and 
individual institutional behavior could help ensure that academic 
recommendations to policy makers are grounded in robust empirical 
results and solid theoretical interpretations. To this respect, this Article has 
focused on exploring the association between defensive measures and 
aggregate institutional behavior. Empirically, it has documented that 
staggered boards and poison pills have radically different implications for 
                                                     
 75. See Cremers et al., supra note 6. 
418 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:387 
both institutional investor behavior per se and its interacted impact on firm 
value. Theoretically, it has drawn on our prior research and provided a 
plausible explanation for these results, suggesting that these different 
implications are a by-product of the differing nature of staggered boards 
and poison pills as bilateral and unilateral defensive measures, 
respectively. Extending this approach to other governance features would 
be beneficial to abandoning current partisan positions and promoting 
optimal solutions to the corporation’s inter-temporal issues. 
